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SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE. By Donald Black. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 1989. Pp. x, 179. $19.95. 
Sociologist Donald Black 1 seeks to expand our knowledge of the 
law by introducing a new field of legal scholarship: the sociology of 
the case. The sociology of the case explores the extent to which vari-
ous sociological factors affect the outcome of a case. In his latest 
book, Sociological Justice, Black argues that the legal profession can 
use the sociology of the case to understand better the impact of social 
status2 upon litigation. 
The field of "legal sociology," a pure sociology of law, attempts to 
increase legal knowledge by imparting sociological teachings to "The 
Law" (p. 3). Legal sociology could furnish the legal profession with 
"a general theory capable of predicting and explaining legal behavior 
of every kind" (p. 4). Such knowledge, Black argues, can increase the 
effectiveness of law; by increasing predictive capabilities, the legal pro-
fession is better able to conform the law in theory to the law in action. 
Black disputes the accuracy of what he calls the jurisprudential 
model of law3 - with its focus on rules, procedure, and logic - as a 
predictor of case outcomes. Instead, he suggests using the "sociologi-
cal model" (p. 20), which analyzes cases by examining the impact of 
various social characteristics of the actors4 upon case outcomes. Black 
calls "the amount of governmental authority brought to bear on a per-
son or group" the "quantity of law" (p. 8). By attempting to explain 
variations in the quantity of law applied to cases presenting apparently 
similar factual situations, Black maintains that the sociological model 
can predict case outcomes more accurately than the jurisprudential 
model. He postulates that the social stature of the actors involved in 
litigation provides a framework, "the social structure of [the] case" (p. 
8). This framework can be used to assess the impact of social stature. 
1. Professor of Social Sciences and Chair of the Department of Sociology at the University of 
Virginia. Black's other publications include THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976). 
2. The term "social status," as used by Black, involves "a number of dimensions, such as 
wealth, education, respectability, integration into society (by employment, marriage, parenthood, 
community service, sociability, etc.), and conventionality (in religion, politics, lifestyle, etc.)?' P. 
9. Sociological Justice explores bow the social status of all the relevant actors in a particular case, 
as perceived by the decisionmaker, may influence the case outcome. See infra note 4. 
3. The jurisprudential model of law, which Black asserts "has long dominated legal thinking 
in the Western world," teaches that law is "fundamentally an affair of rules." P. 19. "The 
jurisprudential model," Black writes, "regards law as a logical process. The facts of each case are 
assessed in light of the applicable rules, and logic determines the result." P. 20. Because the 
jurisprudential model assumes that logic dictates the results of each case, the model should allow 
for easy prediction of case outcomes; cases with similar facts should result in similar outcomes. 
See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CoNCEPT OF LAW (1961). 
4. The term "actor" includes the plaintiff(s), the defendant(s), their attorneys, the jury, and 
the judge(s) involved in each case. 
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This, Black asserts, yields observable data demonstrating that the va-
rying social status of the individual actors produces statistically signifi-
cant differences in the outcome of otherwise factually similar cases. 
I. THE CENTRAL PREMISE 
Black asserts that the outcome of a case may be predicted by as-
sessing its social structure. "Like everything else in the universe,'' 
Black states, "law varies with its [social] environment" (p. 39). Law-
yers should be aware of sociological influences within a case; "a totally 
unsociological lawyer is incompetent" (p. 39). Through ''sociological 
litigation, " or the "application of sociology to the practice of law" (p. 
25), Black argues, lawyers can enjoy a tactical advantage. 
Unfortunately for jurists, Black's discussion of how and to what 
extent sociological factors affect the decision-making process is too 
sparse to be of much interest. He writes that high status parties assert-
ing claims against low status parties, or "downward" cases, have 
greater chances of success than "upward" cases, where low status par-
ties assert claims against high status parties. Black states, for example, 
that "[socially] '[p]athetic plaintiffs' suing people with 'deep pockets' 
would seem to be among the riskiest clients a lawyer could represent" 
(p. 28). Yet he fails to detail how and to what extent this information 
affects the law applied in such a case. 
Black also tends to make assertions, rather than build a persuasive 
argument; he makes bold statements without citing any evidence to 
support them. For example, he states that since prolonging a case in-
creases the degree of intimacy between the parties, it would also in-
crease "the likelihood of a compromise decision that gives something 
to both sides" (p. 36); yet he cites no statistical evidence to support 
this assertion. 
Two more substantive flaws also pervade Black's work. First, 
Black seems to overstate the predictive value of understanding a case's 
social structure. While few would dispute that social factors often 
play a role in determining case outcomes, Black seems to imply that 
only social factors explain the outcome. Readers of Sociological Jus-
tice should be cautious in accepting the author's portrayal of the de-
gree to which social status controls the outcome of cases. Although 
Black never explicitly rejects the jurisprudential model's ability to pre-
dict case outcomes, he does overstate the influence of sociological in-
formation as a predictor. For instance, Black asserts that one of the 
principles of legal sociology is that "[l]egal variation is a direct func-
tion of social information" (p. 64; emphasis omitted) and that "[a]n 
attorney should not regard a case as a precedent unless its social struc-
ture resembles the case to be decided" (p. 30). These statements ap-
pear quite absolute, implying that only the social status of the actors 
involved in litigation can explain variance in the outcome of cases. 
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It is true that the jurisprudential model cannot always explain why 
cases that seemingly are factually similar sometimes have divergent 
outcomes. The sociological model, then, can be an important tool in 
interpreting case variance. But like most analytical tools, the sociolog-
ical model should be used in legal education to supplement the juris-
prudential model, not supplant it. Litigation is complex and 
conditions vary dramatically, so no one model can fully explain every 
aspect of a case. It is telling, however, that, in at least one statement in 
the book, Black admits that sociological considerations provide only 
part of the picture. He notes that "the day may come when law 
professors will ask their students to distinguish one case from another 
... and the answer will be sociological as well as legal" (p. 1; emphasis 
added). Obviously, legal doctrine still influences the outcome of cases. 
A legal education that ignores jurisprudential considerations would be 
just as incomplete as an education that ignores the teachings of 
sociology. 
The second substantive flaw is that Black does not place his work 
in a rather vast literature discussing the limits of conventional legal 
rationality. Certainly, the teaching of any first-year law student in-
volves critical discussion of the jurisprudential model as well as con-
siderations of sociological factors affecting the decision-making 
process, though they may not be referred to in Black's terms. As the 
Realist movement5 firmly established, "[legal] doctrine [can]not be un-
derstood as the final product of a coherent evolutionary process -
that law, like other social phenomena, was the outcome of interactions 
among a chaotic set of contingent forces."6 Realists argued that judi-
cial decisions are not merely "the outcome of reasoning from a finite 
set of determinate principles" and "demanded that legal scholarship 
recognize the social forces influencing legal change."7 Indeed, Karl 
Llewellyn wrote sixty years ago that, when attempting to find cer-
tainty in predicting case outcomes, one should question the "personal-
ity of the judge," a line of questioning, he said, "that will certainly lead 
to inquiry into his social conditioning."8 Black's theories would ap-
pear self-evident to any jurist. 
Even before the emergence of the canonical Realists, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes observed the role of bias in the application of law, 
5. Legal realism was the dominant influence on American legal thought for most of the 1920s 
and 1930s. See generally White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and 
Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. RE.v. 999 (1972). Much of legal 
realism's critical insight is given continued vitality in the Critical Legal Studies movement. See 
generally, Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal 
Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. RE.v. 1669 (1982). 
6. See Note, supra note 5, at 1673. 
7. Id. at 1670. 
8. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism -Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. RE.v. 
1222, 1242-43 (1931). 
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noting that "the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men[] 
have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the 
rules by which men should be govemed."9 By writing that sociologi-
cal factors play a role in legal decisions, Black merely follows a well-
established current in the law. 
II. THE REFORM PROPOSALS 
Black does not end with a discussion of the effects of social infor-
mation upon a case. In Chapters 3 through 5 of Sociological Justice 
(pp. 41-88), Black proposes three reforms that he believes would lessen 
the degree of discrimination due to social variables in the legal system. 
His first reform proposal calls for individuals to form legal coopera-
tives, redesigning the social structure of cases (pp. 50-56). His 'second 
proposal recommends several ways to alter the process by which deci-
sions are made. For example, he suggests using a computer, rather 
than a person, as a judge over a case (pp. 70-72). His final proposal 
would vary the jurisdiction of law itself by leaving some aspects of life 
to alternative realms of regulation and dispute resolution (pp. 81-88). 
Black asserts that if his proposals were adopted, "sociological litiga-
tion would become all but impossible" (p. 40). Unfortunately, he fo-
cuses exclusively on his suggestions' advantages, without exploring 
their substantial limitations or disadvantages. 
A. Incorporating Conflict 
Black's first proposal would redesign the social structure of cases 
by seeking to eliminate the advantages that organizations have over 
individuals. Black reports that organizations such as corporations en-
joy statistically significant advantages in litigation against individu-
als.10 He suggests that individuals could equalize the organizational 
advantage by forming legal cooperatives to litigate on their behalf. 
The existence of these legal co-ops, Black claims, would "balance and 
homogenize the social structure of conflict" (p. 56). 
This reform proposal is modeled after the dia-paying groups of no-
madic Somalia, which resolve, on behalf of their members, disputes 
arising from injuries involving nonmembers (pp. 47-49). Membership 
in these dia-paying groups is determined by family lineage or contrac-
9. o.w. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW s (M. Howe ed. 1963). 
10. To support his point, Black cites statistics from his own book, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 
86-97 (1976). In support of his contention that high status parties are advantaged, Black offers 
only his earlier assertion that actors of perceived higher status enjoy statistically significant ad· 
vantages in litigation. This assumes, of course, that organizations are necessarily "high status" 
entities. Even if this is so, perhaps other, nonstatus, factors not considered by Black play a more 
significant role in producing the organizational advantage. For instance, because organizations 
have greater financial means, they are able to hire better skilled attorneys who can devote greater 
resources to developing their client's case. A better prepared and presented case could be the 
cause of the asserted advantage. 
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tual relations. Black proposes that hundreds, perhaps thousands, of 
such legal co-ops be formed throughout society. These legal co-ops 
would serve essentially two functions. First, they would resolve· con-
flicts by either representing members in disputes with nonmembers or 
arbitrating disputes between members. Second, they would provide 
compensation to injured parties for any losses suffered at the hands of 
their members. This would spread the costs of compensation through 
a prescribed formula to all of the co-op's members, with the member 
causing the harm and that member's immediate family bearing a dis-
proportionate share of the expense. 
Claiming that adopting similar patterns would "balance and ho-
mogenize the social structure of conflict, obliterating many of the so-
cial differences between cases and reducing discrimination of all 
kinds" (p. 56), Black cites several advantages to these dispute resolu-
tion patterns. His analysis, however, leaves many questions unan-
swered. How many cooperatives should exist? What size should each 
one be? What would be the cost of membership? Who would pay for 
indigents? If "society" is to pay the cost for indigents, isn't this propo-
sal just a mask for socialized litigation? What would be the jurisdic-
tion of such groups? In fact, is not the present, individual state court 
system already such a dispute-resolving body - a legal cooperative 
designed to resolve disputes between its (citizen) members? 
Black fails to analyze critically another important consideration: 
the composition of the membership of each cooperative. The goal of 
nondiscrimination between co-ops could be achieved only if the legal 
co-ops he envisions are perceived as social "equals." Without such 
equality, the social structure of cases would simply be recreated be-
tween the new legal co-ops, based on the differences in social status of 
the legal co-ops or members involved. Who, then, is to decide the 
group's composition and how is this decision to be made? 
The same problem exists within each co-op. Discrimination could 
still exist in intramembership disputes based on the unequal status of 
the particular members. How would society prevent discrimination 
within the cooperative? And, who would resolve grievances of a mem-
ber against the member's own cooperative? 
Black's discussion of the regulation of membership of such groups 
is also unsatisfactory. Anything other than full participation would 
leave an unfortunate few "doomed to individuality" (p. 54). But the 
question remains, should society force membership upon individuals? 
While Black suggests making membership a mandatory incident of 
employment, he fails to examine the troublesome implications of such 
forced participation. If groups must accept individuals, should they be 
allowed to expel members? How will this process be supervised to 
ensure that the process is not marred by discrimination? Black's dis-
cussion of liability is similarly elliptical. His proposed system would 
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limit individual liability by spreading the cost of liability to the legal 
co-op, "though the individual directly involved in each case would re-
ceive or contribute a disproportionate share" of the costs (p. 50). The 
legal co-op, with heightened financial means, could more easily com-
pensate victims. With compensation to victims a central goal of the 
legal co-op, Black predicts that an emphasis would be placed on the 
"resolution" of a case rather than the "legal enforcement" of princi-
ples guiding social life (p. 52). Black fails to consider, however, 
whether limiting liability would produce socially desirable results. 
What, for example, would be the impact of his proposal if it were to 
eliminate the deterrent effects of liability on the causes of harm? 
Black also suggests that cooperatives could end the need for crimi-
nal trials for individuals by having the legal co-op make compensation 
to the victim or the victim's family (p. 51). This suggestion, however, 
disregards the retributive11 and deterrent12 functions of the criminal 
law. While Black may wish to abandon these functions, it seems odd 
to advocate their complete abolition without the slightest discussion. 
B. Delegalizing Society 
Another of Black's suggestions would vary the jurisdiction of law 
itself. He suggests reducing the overall "quantity of law," leaving 
some aspects of life to alternative realms of regulation and dispute res-
olution (pp. 81-88). His suggestion, which he calls "legal minimalism" 
or the "delegalization of ... society" (p. 81), is twofold. First, Black 
suggests that the amount of discrimination observed in trials could be 
lessened by decreasing the number of trials. Second, discrimination 
could be further lessened by reducing the number and reach of laws 
guiding peoples' lives (pp. 86-88). He believes that reducing the 
number of laws and enacting obstacles to parties seeking redress for 
wrongs through the courts would force individuals to turn to alterna-
tive means of dispute resolution (p. 78). These alternative forms of 
dispute resolution would, Black asserts, be characterized by less dis-
crimination than found in the courts. 
Black offers the Japanese legal system as a "natural experiment" 
(p. 84) in this proposal. He points out that there are far fewer judges 
and licensed lawyers in Japan than in the United States. He argues 
that this fact, coupled with heightened barriers to litigation, acts to 
reduce the number of litigated cases. Consequently, individuals seek 
alternative forms of redress such as self-help, which in tum lessens 
discrimination (p. 85). 
Although Black's statistics concerning the number of judges and 
licensed lawyers are fairly accurate, his analysis of these statistics is 
11. A. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 92-93 (1953). 
12. See e.g., Andenaes, General Prevention - Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 176 (1952). 
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seriously flawed for several reasons. First, Black assumes that the 
number oflawyers and judges in Japan, relatively few compared to the 
number of lawyers in the United States, reveals a great deal about the 
interaction of laws to social intercourse in modem Japanese society. 
This assumption is questionable. Licensed members of the Japanese 
legal profession, called bengoshi, number only slightly above 13,000.13 
However, there are "several other legal 'professions' whose members 
are licensed to handle matters that in the United States would be han-
dled only by licensed lawyers."14 In Japan, unlike the United States, 
practicing law requires only an undergraduate degree. Those who 
graduate with an undergraduate law degree (LL.B.) are often licensed 
in other professions and number nearly 100,000.15 Many law gradu-
ates move into business without ever passing, or even taking, Japan's 
National Law Exam.16 These graduates are not "practicing law" in 
the sense of the practitioner advocating a client's position before a 
court. Like many American lawyers however, they perform various 
"legal" roles such as negotiating contracts or counseling business cli-
ents about the state of the law. When these unlicensed "lawyers" are 
added to the ranks of the bengoshi, the number of people in the Japa-
nese legal profession is comparable to the number of lawyers in the 
United States.17 
Second, although there are fewer litigated cases in Japan, 18 Black 
fails to question the desirability of this result. For many acts consid-
ered "wrongs" in the United States, there may be no means of redress 
13. Miller, Apples vs. Persimmons: The Legal Profession in Japan and the United States, 39 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 27, 27 (1989). This leaves Japan with roughly one licensed lawyer for every 9000 
Japanese citizens. In the same period, the United States reported 650,000 lawyers, or roughly 
one licensed lawyer for every 400 U.S. citizens. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF CoM-
MERCE STATISTICAL AllsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1988, at 376, Table 627 (108th ed. 
1987). 
14. See Miller, supra note 13, at 28. 
15. Id. at 29. 
16. Chen, The National Law Examination of Japan, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1 (1989). 
17. The 100,000 legal professionals in Japan lower the per capita ratio of "lawyers" in Japan 
to roughly one in 1100. This is much closer to the U.S. per capita ratio of lawyers. See supra 
note 13. 
18. Professor Miller offers three principal reasons for the lower number of litigated cases in 
Japan: 
First, there may be far fewer transactions of the kind most likely to generate lawsuits. For 
example, although Japan has about half the population of the United States, its automobile 
accident death rate is only slightly above 9000 per year, about one-fifth of the annual rate in 
[the] United States of close to 50,000 deaths! 
Miller, supra note 13, at 32. "Another important reason,'' he continues, "may be that Japan is 
only now beginning to experience a growth of court-enforceable rights comparable to that which 
the Warren Court initiated in the United States." Id. at 32-33. Finally, he writes "Perhaps the 
principal reason litigation in Japan is not a favored method of resolving disputes is that there are 
built-in barriers of considerable dimension" and then concludes by listing some of these barriers: 
comparatively high court filing fees, initial attorney retainer fees, the nature of Japanese pretrial 
and trial procedures, and the absence of a right to a jury trial. Id. at 33-35. 
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in Japan. 19 Professor Richard Miller postulates that "the factors that 
tend to close the courts to ordinary citizens render Japanese courts 
and trial lawyers inaccessible to an extent that would be deemed outra-
geous in the United States."20 Moreover, such barriers could raise 
constitutional problems. 21 
Finally, Black does not clearly show how a reduction in the 
amount of litigation would lessen discrimination. Black fails to ex-
amine his assumption that a reduction in the quantity of law will lead 
to lessened societal discrimination. Certainly, if his proposals were 
adopted, the number of observed cases of discrimination in trials 
might decrease in absolute terms, but only because we would have 
fewer trials. It is entirely likely that, by reducing the quantity of law, 
individuals would be left with fewer avenues for remedying discrimi-
nation. How is one with a discrimination claim to seek redress in a 
legal vacuum? 
The closest Black comes to establishing a link between legal 
minimalism and reduced discrimination is the assertion that "[l]egal 
minimalism seems to strengthen social cohesion" (p. 85). He cites, 
once again, the experience of Japan. Yet Japan seems a peculiarly in-
apt comparison. It is an extremely homogeneous, thus naturally cohe-
sive, society. The United States, on the other hand, is increasingly 
heterogenous. And with respect to non-Japanese persons, Japan seems 
to exhibit a high degree of racial intolerance.22 Japan certainly is not a 
model discrimination-free society that the United States should strive 
to emulate. 
Sociological Justice describes how social characteristics affect the 
decision-making process of a case. Black concludes that an examina-
tion of the social status of parties involved in a lawsuit can explain the 
variance of legal outcomes in cases with similar factual situations -
but this is a notion that has been acknowledged, and much discussed, 
since the birth of the Legal Realist movement in the 1920s and 1930s. 
If Black's book accomplishes anything, it is the addition of a new term 
- the "sociological model" - to describe how social factors affect 
19. For example, if the United States required court filing fees and initial attorney retainer 
fees to the extent they are required in Japan, many poor people with legitimate product liability 
claims against corporations, could not afford to sue and thus would be effectively barred from 
seeking any redress. See id. at 33-34. 
20. Id. at 37-38. 
21. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process concerns prohibit a state 
from denying, solely because of inability to pay court fees and costs, access to its courts to indi-
gents who seek judicial dissolution of their marriage). 
22. In a Newsweek poll taken in Japan, 31 % of the respondents cited "too many different 
racial and ethnic groups" as a "very serious" problem hampering U.S. economic development. 
What Japan Thinks of Us, Newsweek, Apr. 12, 1990, at 24. There are many reports of wide-
spread discrimination against those living in Japan who are not ethnic Japanese. See, e.g., 
Umakoshi, The Education of Korean Children in Japan, in EDUCATION AND THE INTEGRATION 
OF ETHNIC MINoRmES 36 (1986) (referring to widespread discrimination against Koreans in 
Japan). 
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case outcomes. Black's discussion of his reform proposals is utopian 
and it fails to deal with potential objections. He ignores both the im-
practicality of his proposals and the possibility that their adoption 
could exacerbate, not lessen, discrimination. 
- Christopher M. Adams 
